



# Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

## Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 October 2016

### About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
**Executive Summary:** In October, IED events in the Asia-Pacific region increased (up 13%) from last month, largely due to an increase in IED events in South Asia. Despite this increase, IED-related casualties dropped by a substantial 62% from September, with 52 total casualties this month compared to 137 from the previous month. IED rate. Overall IED activity decreased in both Southeast and Northeast Asia, however, a rise in both IED cache recoveries and attacks in South Asia resulted in a spike in the region's IED rate.

There were **78** IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in October 2016




Icons depict events for OCT 2016; heat map depicts event density from OCT2015 - OCT 2016


October IED events



October IED events by Country




October IED Casualties



Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

# October Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region




In South Asia, the IED event rate increased from 36 IED events in September to 57 in October. The IED-related casualty rate also rose, with 21 casualties in October compared to 17 casualties last month. In Bangladesh, activity increased significantly from three events in September to 12 events in October. In India, an uptick in political violence and an escalation in Maoist rebel attacks contributed to a 32% increase in IED activity from September. Additionally, ramped up anti-terrorism operations by Indian security forces in Kerala and along Jammu and Kashmir's Line of Control (LoC), led to a rise in IED cache recoveries and the seizure of 125 IEDs (**see pg. 9**). In Nepal, nationwide police raids on 24 OCT resulted in the capture of 13 Mongol Mulbasi Rastriya Force militants and two IED cache recoveries (**see pg. 10**).

In Southeast Asia, there was a 35% decrease in IED activity from September. The IED-related casualty rate also fell significantly, with 28 IED-related casualties this month compared to 114 from the previous month. In the Philippines, IED activity continued to remain lower than normal with ten reported IED events. On 4 OCT and 29 OCT, law enforcement officials conducted operations that led to IED cache recoveries and the arrests of key terrorist suspects linked to the deadly 2 SEP Davao City Roxas Night Market bombing (**see pg. 12**). In Thailand, there was a notable drop in IED activity, down from 16 IED events in SEP to 4 IED events in OCT (**see pg. 13**). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, three IED detonation events and a 20 OCT suspected Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) inspired attack will likely prompt Indonesian security forces to step up counter-insurgency measures (**see pg. 15**).

In Northeast Asia IED activity remained low, however, a PBIED attack that injured three civilian bystanders and resulted in the death of the attacker occurred on 23 OCT in Utsunomiya City, Japan (**see pg. 17**).

*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.*

# PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months




Icons depict events from OCT 2015 to OCT 2016; occasional overlap occurs

South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately one-third less activity than South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore some events may not be reflected.


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED events




Past Year IED events by Country




# IED Activity - Past 12 Months

## Switch Type



## Target Affiliation



*Threat is based on reporting for past month and includes devices detonated or found and cleared. IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and target affiliation.*

## Letter to our Readers: Changes to the APCFC C-IED Monthly Report

Beginning this month, our Intelligence reports will be able to more accurately reflect all reported IED events in the PACOM AOR, not just main events, providing improved accuracy of data and reporting in the APCFC C-IED Monthly Report. Because of this change, we expect to see a slight rise in the number of found and cleared, hoax, and cache IED events per month going forward.

Additionally, we can now track IED device numbers within events; these numbers will allow us to more accurately depict the number of IEDs associated with events and provide more insight on device numbers in a country and region.

Lastly, to more efficiently distribute our monthly report, we are transitioning to distributing our report via a website versus distribution email. We will begin transitioning this month and through the end of the year provide the report by both methods; beginning in January, our report will be available only at

<https://www.usarpac.army.mil/apcied/IEDMonthlyMain.htm>



## India Uncovers Unexpectedly Large JMB Support Network in Eastern States

On 27 SEP, press reported that the Kolkata Police's Special Task Force (STF) had captured six Jama'at-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) personnel in West Bengal and Assam. Five of the detainees were wanted in connection with the 2014 Burdwan explosion that first revealed the presence of JMB cells in India; one of the detainees was later discovered to be JMB's Bengal chief, Anwar Hossain Faruk. Though JMB has not been at the center of much Indian activity of any kind since the "Burdwan Blast," the investigation following this capture revealed a far larger JMB infrastructure than expected, and pointed to a possible future vulnerability to domestic attacks as ISIL continues to make inroads with JMB in Bangladesh.

Electronic media recovered during the September raid revealed that Anwar led a significant portion of the network, and tracked the finances of JMB-India. That information also indicated that JMB operates in a highly organized hierarchy, and that the group totals about 500 people spread across West Bengal and Assam. The size of JMB's Indian network is much larger than previously assessed. Though the Burdwan Blast, in which a West Bengal-based JMB IED factory accidentally detonated, put JMB on the defensive and drove their activity deeper underground, the size and distribution of the network would suggest that the impact of a handful of identified fugitives would be a relatively minor impediment to their operations. Despite this, there has been little terrorist activity attributed to JMB-India before or after the Burdwan incident, despite claims from India's National Investigation Agency (NIA) that JMB was partnering with Bodo insurgents to conduct attacks on Indian soil.

Information obtained following the investigation of the original Burdwan incident may provide an indication of why such a large network produces such a small amount of activity. The wife of a JMB operative that died in the detonation told investigators that the cell had produced seven shipments of 50-100 IEDs, and had sent them all to Bangladesh, suggesting that site had been supporting JMB operations outside of India, as opposed to planning



JMB Detainee is Escorted by Security Personnel —SEP 2016


attacks within their safe-haven. **(See OCT 2014 special assessment)** Interrogators from Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion were also exploring the facilitation angle, as they sought to determine whether Indian JMB cells had provided the explosives used in the July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka—one of Bangladesh's most lethal terrorist encounters. Even the Bodo partnership seems to indicate JMB-India cells mostly seeks to manufacture and facilitate explosives to other groups, as opposed to conducting attacks themselves, especially considering the lucrative nature of crude bomb sales around West Bengal and Assam. **(See MAY 2016 special assessment)**


Despite the India-based JMB cells' focus on providing logistical support and safe-haven to Bangladesh-based JMB members, the size of the network and its apparent expertise in IED construction nonetheless presents a significant vulnerability to India, given the JMB's increasing affinity for ISIL. A salient example of this vulnerability is that an ISIL-aligned Neo-JMB attack has already been facilitated from India. According to information obtained from one of the captured JMB members, the AK-22 assault rifles used in the Holey Artisan Bakery attack were manufactured in West Bengal by Pakistan-trained gunsmiths, and smuggled into Bangladesh via Chapainawabgunj a month before the attack. Additionally, at least four mid-level leaders of the Neo-JMB faction fled to India following the July attack, suggesting the Indian network is willing and able to provide safe-haven for Neo-JMB personnel as well. Lastly, though he was described as a "Lone Wolf," a man identified as Mohammad Masiuddin was radicalized by former Indian Mujahideen and current ISIL-in-India recruiter Shafi Armar. Masiuddin went on to establish connections with JMB and operated on their behalf and ISIL's in India. All together, these events illustrate an increasing ISIL influence and presence within India-based JMB elements.

Ultimately, the capture of India-based JMB leadership only strengthens previous assessments that JMB-India only exists to facilitate operations in Bangladesh and no attacks are anticipated in India in the short term, other than those caused by IED sales to existing local groups. However, recent captures, shifting allegiances within JMB, and increasing ISIL influence within the JMB jihadist may make India vulnerable to this network in the long term, as ISIL could use it to initiate operations in India.

**Sources:** Times of India (9/27/16), (10/29/16) Indian Express (9/28/16), (10/13/16) Daily Mail (9/23/16) Hindustan Times (10/24/16) WIO News (8/16/16), (10/23/16)

# Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

<b>SUBJECT: Syed Mohammad Ziaul Haque</b>	
<b>NATIONALITY:</b> Bangladesh <b>PROFESSION:</b> Former Bangladeshi Army Major, Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) Military Commander <b>AFFILIATIONS:</b> al-Qa'ida, Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh <b>BOUNTY:</b> USD25,000 (2million taka)	
<p>Syed Mohammed Ziaul Haque (aliases Sagar, Ishtiaque, Major Zia) is a former Bangladeshi Army Engineer Corps Major, originally from Mostafapur, Moulvibazar. He attended Bangladesh's Military Institute of Science and Technology, and is said to be highly technologically proficient. Zia has been involved in militant activity since at least 2010. He was identified as one of the primary suspects of the failed 2011 coup d'état, for which he recruited 12-13 army officers, with the ultimate goal of implementing Sharia law in Bangladesh; he has been a fugitive since he was identified as a key player in the coup attempt. Zia has allegedly been trained in special operations, and is involved in the planning and operations of al-Qa'ida-aligned ABT.</p> <p>ABT is believed to have been one of the primary instigators of and actors in the attacks on secular bloggers and religious minorities over the past several years, including the murder of American citizen Avjit Roy. As an operational military commander for ABT, Zia has been directly supporting these attacks, though he is likely associated with several militant organizations. Recognizing the operational potential for cooperation between militant groups, the jailed leaders of JMB and ABT allegedly had a meeting in 2014 in which they decided to include Zia as an operational planner and military commander behind the scenes. Because of this relationship, Bangladeshi authorities were quick to implicate Zia, along with Tamim Chowdhury (head of Neo-JMB, deceased August 2016), for the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in July 2016. Historically, however, the relationship between Neo-JMB and ABT has been one of competition, making allegations of cooperation between the groups and leaders significant.</p>	
<b>Sources:</b> DailyStar (1/21/12) DailyStar (9/12/12) DhakaTribune (9/21/14) Prothom Alo (4/24/16) Reuters (6/29/16) DhakaTribune (8/3/16) BDNews24 (8/3/16) NewAgeBD (8/3/16) Washington Post (8/27/16) DhakaTribune (10/31/16)	

<b>VEO: Neo-Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh</b>	
	<b>AREA OF OPERATIONS:</b> Bangladesh <b>TTPs:</b> Guerrilla Warfare, Sabotage, Crude IEDs, Hostage Taking <b>FOUNDED:</b> 2014
<p>Neo-JMB, formed in 2014, was originally led by the late Tamim Chowdhury, identified by ISIL in Syria as the emir of Bangladesh in Dabiq magazine issue 14. The organization first drew the attention of law enforcement after committing the April 2015 Bangladesh Commerce Bank Limited (BCBL) robbery near Dhaka city that left eight people dead. Neo-JMB's original members were former JMB operatives, who distinguished themselves by being motivated by ISIL ideology. While JMB attacks have traditionally been small-scale and politically motivated, Neo-JMB planned and executed relatively large-scale, ideologically-motivated attacks, such as the July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack that killed 29 and wounded another 50. Following this attack, media began reporting on Neo-JMB, prompting Bangladeshi officials to openly discuss Neo-JMB and ISIL ties for the first time.</p> <p>Recognizing and acknowledging this difference between Neo-JMB and JMB, Bangladeshi authorities have made concerted efforts to capture or kill Neo-JMB operatives. Partial data indicates that approximately 41 Neo-JMB operatives have been killed and a further 80 have been arrested since July 2016. These operatives include financier Nazmul Haque (alias Abdur Rahman), 'commander' Ripon (aliases Golam Tareque and Abu Ibrahim; planner of the Holey Artisan Bakery attack), Tamim Ahmed Chowdhury, and military 'commander' Murad (aliases Jahangir Alam, Omar, and Major Shaheb). While exerting continual pressure to dismantle Neo-JMB and other militant elements will likely help mitigate immediate threats, long-term threat mitigation will require the root causes of extremism in Bangladesh to be comprehensively addressed.</p>	
<b>Sources:</b> BDNews24 (8/17/16) DailyStar (8/31/16) BenarNews (10/8/16) Strategic Study India (10/25/16) CanIndia (10/24/16)	

# South Asia: October Significant Activity

## Bangladesh

Starting on 8 OCT, Bangladeshi counter-terrorism and law enforcement personnel began 'Operation Spate 8,' ultimately leading to the death of 12 probable Neo-JMB operatives in Gazipur, Tangail, and the Dhaka area. The operation combined Counter-Terrorism Transnational Crime (CTTC), Special Weapons and Tactic (SWAT), and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) personnel, and local police. Since the Holey Artisan Bakery attack on 1 JUL, Bangladeshi authorities have killed over 40 alleged operatives and arrested approximately 80 others. One of the militants killed was identified as Abdur Rahman, the alleged Neo-JMB financier of the Holey Artisan Bakery attack. **Strategic Studies (10/25/16)**

## Bangladesh-India

Following on two joint CT events in September, India and Bangladesh furthered dialogue on developing joint CT capabilities during a meeting between Bangladesh's PM Sheikh Hasina and India's PM Narendra Modi in Goa, India on 23 OCT. Possible capability-building activities include a bi-lateral conference, and a CT exercise. PM Hasina will be returning to India in December 2016 to continue talks with her counterpart. **Economic Times (10/24/16)**

## India

On 10 OCT, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operative Zia-ul-Haq was released from Warangal Central Prison after serving a seven-year sentence for conspiring to organize terror attacks. In 2010, Haq was arrested by the Special Investigation Team for being a member of LeT's sleeper cell. During a search at his residence, police recovered a grenade and a pistol. **NYOOZ (10/11/16)**

On 12 OCT, press reported that Jayaswal Neco Industries Limited (JNIL) was granted clearance for mining operations in the Kanker district, Chhattisgarh—an area known for Maoist operations. One of the conditions for obtaining the mining permit was that the company had to engage in manual mining, as opposed to using explosives to extract ore. Though the cost of manual mining is approximately three times that of using explosives, it is expected to become the standard in areas where left-wing extremists operate. Previously, Maoists were known for stealing or purchasing surplus explosives from mining sites, which were a vital resource for IED construction, and changes in explosives policy have led to a dramatic reduction in IED activity; this new regulation is an extension of those reforms. **Business Standard (10/12/16)**

On 17 OCT, security forces conducted a counter-terror operation in the Kashmir area resulting in the arrests of 44 suspects and the seizure of Molotov cocktails, Chinese and Pakistani flags, LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) documents and unauthorized mobile phones. **Deccan Chronicle (10/18/16)**

As of mid-October, Indian Army patrols in Jammu and Kashmir are now using jammers as a result of a number of RCIED detonations along the border region. The device weighs approximately 80kg along with batteries, and can jam any frequency within a radius of 50 meters during mobile patrolling. It covers HF, VHF, and UHF frequencies in cluster configuration for Army use, or suite configuration for Navy ground and onboard usage. In addition to detecting, locating, and jamming "frequency agile" communications, it can also monitor and record conventional signals. The jammer was developed by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization for the Indian Army. **Deccan Herald (10/13/16)**


On 22 OCT, Indian press reported on a ceasefire violation along the PS Pura sector of Jammu district, Jammu and Kashmir. According to the report, on the 21st and 22nd, Pakistani Rangers attacked border hamlets and outposts with mortar shells and fire from automatic weapons, which India responded to with retaliatory fire. As a result of the firing and shelling along border areas, over 1,000 people living in the area had to be migrated to safety. Previously, ceasefire violations have been linked to increases in IED activity. **Times of India (10/22/16)**

## Nepal

Recent caches recovered in Rolpa and Kathmandu have revealed the presence of former Maoist guerillas and other extremists uniting under the name Mongol Mulbasi Rastriya Force. The organization has at least three sub-groups: Mongol National Force, Mongol Mulbasi Force (Kinrati), and Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha. Reporting suggests the groups have been planning donation terror, KFR, extortion, and looting; authorities uncovered plans to steal firearms from police stations and ambush vehicles. The strength of the group is believed to be about 100 people, and may also consist of a military wing called the Mongol National Army. **MyRepublica (10/25/16)**



# Bangladesh: October IED Events



There were 12 events: six IED detonations (nine devices) and 6 IED caches (12 devices)


On 6 OCT, an IED cache was recovered by police following the arrest of a suspected JMB militant in Shibpur, Puthia, Rajshahi. The cache contained five crude bombs, two petrol bombs, and Jihadi books.

**Financial Express (10/7/16)**

On 8 OCT, an IED cache was recovered following a Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) raid to arrest Sarwar Jahan (alias Abdur Rahman, Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif) in Ashulia, Dhaka. The cache included Tk 3 million (USD 38,000), a firearm, ammunition, a bladed weapon, explosives, and a mobile phone frequency jammer. **BD News 24 (10/9/16) 7 News (10/21/16) Daily Star (10/21/16) Dhaka Tribune (10/22/16)**

On 25 OCT, IEDs detonated and an IED cache was recovered during a raid on a JMB meeting by police at a farmhouse in Khalishkhali, Kachua, Bagerhat, Khulna; three police officers were injured by crude bomb blasts. The cache contained five crude bombs, two revolvers, two bullets, five cell phones, one computer, bomb making materials, and seven empty bullet casings. **Dhaka Tribune (10/25/16) Daily Star (10/26/16) Rising BD (10/25/16)**

Past Year IED Events by Type




On 28 OCT, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of four Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HuJI) militants in Nandoain, Gazipur, Dhaka. The cache contained four crude bombs, 14 petrol bombs, two knives, one machete, electronic devices, and jihadi books. **Dhaka Tribune (10/28/16) Daily Star (10/28/16) BD News 24 (10/28/16)**

On 29 OCT, four IEDs detonated by Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) on Begum Rokeya University Rangpur campus, Rangpur. ICS activists also pasted anti-government posters around the campus, criticizing the on-going war crimes tribunal. **Dhaka Tribune (10/29/16)**

On 31 OCT, a premature IED detonation occurred in Uttapara, Narsingdi Sadar, Dhaka, injuring ten civilians. Authorities suspect that the bomb makers were planning to sell the IEDs. **Daily Sun (10/31/16) BanglaNews24 (10/31/16)**

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




IED activity increased in October, coinciding with the on-going crackdown on militant activity related to JMB and Neo-JMB operatives, such as Abdur Rahman and Tamim Chowdhury, that started following the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in July 2016. November saw the targeting of several militants directly involved with the planning and execution of the deadly July attack, and several caches (with some containing IEDs) were recovered during these operations.

The 29 OCT detonations at Begum Rokeya University by ICS militants serve as a reminder of the on-going political violence in Bangladesh that has been overshadowed by increased activity of ISIL- and AQ-aligned militant groups. The IEDs detonated to protest the war crimes tribunal and the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. ICS is the student wing of Jama'at-e-Islami, is aligned with the Bangladesh National Party led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, and is considered a major student organization at campuses across the country.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.



# India: October IED Events



There were 41 IED events: 17 detonations (24 devices), six found and cleared (nine devices), and 18 caches (125 devices)

On 1 OCT, an IED discovered by train passengers was found and cleared by a bomb disposal unit on a track leading to the Ghorasahan railway station in Ghorasahan, Bihar. Police suspect that Maoists were responsible for placing the device on the track. **Times of India (10/2/16)**

On 3 OCT, an IED cache was recovered by a joint force of district police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel in Nawadih, Bokaro, Jharkhand. The cache contained five gelatin sticks, one kilogram of explosives, five detonators, codex wire, Naxalite posters and literature. Authorities arrested one suspected Maoist in connection to the cache. **Times of India (10/4/16)**  
**Telegraph India (10/4/16)**

On 4 OCT, an IED detonated against a Bharatiya Janata Party leader (BJP) by four suspects near the Villupuram Taluka Police Station, Villupuram, Tamil Nadu. **India Today (10/4/16)**

On 11 OCT, an IED cache was recovered by police and one person was arrested from a group of BJP members at a party office in Chakkarakkal, Kannur. The cache contained over a hundred types of weapons including IEDs, swords, and axes. **The News Minute (10/13/16)**


On 15 OCT, an IED cache was recovered by the Black Cat Commandos of the Uttar Pradesh Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) from two apartments in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA), Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The cache contained six pistols, 50 cartridges, 45 gelatin rods, 125 detonators, and 13 mobile phones. **NewsNation (10/16/16)**

On 23 OCT, an IED cache was recovered by the Mumbai ATS and state police on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad highway between Varai and Sativli, Thane, Maharashtra. The cache contained 35 gelatin sticks, 39 detonators, 4.5kg of white powder and 14kg of black powder. **Hindustan Times (10/28/16)**


In October, over half of IED events were cache finds and device discoveries by security forces. Maoists continued to disrupt services in the Red Corridor by attacking railways with IEDs in retaliation for increased pressure from security forces. Maoist activity is expected to decrease as security forces continue their insurgent-focused operations in the region.

An emerging jihadist group, "The Base Movement," has established a pattern of targeting court houses with small scale IEDs. Though details remain sparse, the group appears to be ideologically predisposed towards aligning with trans-national groups such as al-Qa'ida and ISIL. IED activity is expected to decrease as supplies and device interdictions continue.

Past Year IED Events by Type





Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

# Nepal: October IED Events



There were two IED events: two explosives caches (no devices)


On 24 OCT, an explosives cache was recovered following the arrest of 9 suspects in Bhaktapur, Kathmandu Valley. The cache contained unknown explosives, two revolvers, two pistols, and 12 rounds of ammunition.

**Republica (10/25/16)**

On 24 OCT, an explosives cache was recovered following the arrest of 4 suspects in Rolpa. The cache contained 22 'glass bullets', nine handmade air guns, and 100 pieces of shrapnel. **Republica (10/25/16)**

The October cache events highlight the ongoing social unrest in Nepal. The 13 arrested individuals are suspected to be a part of a growing group of Maoists that are involved in criminal or low-level militant activity. Several smaller groups, under the organization Mongol Mulbasi Rastriya Force, have come to the forefront in recent months. Authorities suspect the groups may be involved in looting, KFR, and donation terror activities.

# Sri Lanka: October IED Events



There were two IED events: two explosives caches (no devices)

On 15 OCT, an explosives cache was recovered by police in Hegalla, Kosgoda, Southern Province. The cache contained 1.75kg C4, 17 rounds of T56 ammunition, and detonators. **Daily Mirror (10/15/16)**

On 29 OCT, an explosives cache was recovered by Mannar police at the Pallimunai checkpoint at the Thalaimannar/Mannar Road intersection, Mannaris, Mannar, Northern Province. The cache contained 7,500 detonators. Authorities arrested two suspects, ages 22 and 25; one of the suspects stated that the detonators had been brought to Sri Lanka via boat from Tamil Nadu, India. **Global Tamil News (10/29/16)**

Authorities have not released information on the suspects to indicate an intended use for the two, but they could be used for illegal fish bombing, mining operations, or criminal activity. Since the end of the civil war, the majority of IED activity in Sri Lanka is criminal and/or commercial in nature.

*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.*

# Southeast Asia: October Significant Activity

## Philippines

On 8 OCT, the Philippine National Police (PNP) prevented an attempted attack by Malaysian terrorist and bomb expert Mohamas Amin in Manila. Amin had a P600,000 bounty against him, has been linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Philippines military is trying to determine if he was training ASG members on how to construct explosives. At the time of his capture, he had in possession: a fragmentation grenade, several rounds of ammunition, various identification cards, a blueprint of a condo mall in Quezon City and a cellular phone. Earlier this month the Army captured Ahmad Tarmizi Muhamad Sayoto, another Malaysian suspected of training the ASG in bomb-making, as he was attempting to flee back to Malaysia. **Inquirer (10/10/16) Malay Mail Online (10/26/16) The Straits Times (10/27/2016)**

## Thailand

On 8 OCT, a leaked memo signed by the Samut Prakan suburb's police commander, marked "most urgent," indicated that Bangkok's southeastern neighborhood was to be on alert for a potential car bomb at its airports and at several landmarks. Intelligence gained by police reported that the attack was to occur in late October. An attack never occurred, possibly due to the reported arrest of 105 people from the Ramkhamhaeng University in Bangkok from 10-12 OCT. Of the reported 105 arrested only 44 names were released to the public and five men were taken to and are being held for questioning under martial law at Inkayuth Borihan Fort, a military installation in Pattani province. Some NGO's are claiming the arrests were arbitrary, however, the Ramkhamhaeng area was targeted by an IED in the 2013. The 2013 attack involved perpetrators who originated from the southern provinces, albeit purportedly "hired" to do the job according to government sources. **Brookings (8/19/15) Benar News (10/25/16) Thai Visa News (10/10/16)**

## Indonesia

In early October, the Chief of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) announced that forming a permanent joint task force to increase cooperation on counterterrorism efforts across the Indonesian government has entered its final stage. The announcement followed the submission of the task force's draft framework to the Office of Coordination Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Ministry for approval. The task force will consist of 17 government institutions such as the National Police, Indonesian military (TNI), Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), Social Affairs Ministry, the Education and Culture Ministry, and the Commutations and Information Ministry. **Jakarta Post (10/6/16)**

## Malaysia

In late October, Malaysia launched the National Special Operations Force (NSOF), a new integrated special operations unit designated tasked with first responder duties for local terror threats. NSOF, which was recently described as "almost fully operational" by the Malaysian Prime Minister, will comprise 170 personnel from across the Malaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysian Police, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency. The NSOF will be based at the Sunga Besi military camp just outside of Kuala Lumpur. **The Diplomat (11/1/16) Channel News Asia (10/28/16)**

## Singapore

On 17 OCT, Singapore conducted the largest counterterrorism exercise it has ever held. The 18-hour operation involved over 3,200 officers from the Singapore Armed Forces, Singapore Police Force, Singapore Civil Defense Force, and Immigration and Checkpoints Authority. The exercise, which unfolded in two phases, was designed to validate the ability for the civilian and military security sectors to deliver a combined response. In the first phase, information on bomb attacks in the region increased Singapore's threat level and resulted in additional civilian and military personnel being deployed to 360 locations for land and border security patrols. In the second phase, terrorists began entering Singapore by boat and attacked the Marina Country Club in a string of mock attacks based on the November 2015 Paris bombings. These events led to coordinated responses from the Singapore police's Emergency Response Team, the police's Special Operations Command Anti-Swarming Teams, military's Special Operations Task Force, and perimeter security from a battalion-sized Army Deployment Force. Following a firefight with the "gunmen", a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives (CBRE) team moved into the scene to defuse a suicide vest. **Strait Times (10/18/16) Today Online (10/18/16)**



# Philippines: October IED Events



There were 10 IED events: three found and cleared (three devices), and seven caches (six devices)


On 4 OCT, an IED cache was recovered following the capture of three Davao bombing suspects at a mobile checkpoint in Cotabato, Maguindano, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao. Three men were taken into custody after attempting to avoid the checkpoint while riding a motorcycle without a license plate. Troops recovered IEDs, a sub-machine gun, a .45 caliber pistol, and cellular phones. The suspects were taken into custody for their involvement in the 2 SEP Davao bombing. **Inquirer (10/7/16) The Daily Progress (10/7/16)**

On 15 OCT, an RCIED was found by a civilian and cleared by Police EOD at a carnival located near a national highway in Purok Sampaguita, Poblacion 8, Midsayap, North Cotabato, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao. The device was in a plastic bag and described as a 57mm warhead with blasting caps and cellphone as detonator. Witnesses say the device was left by a woman and three men who were onboard a van. **ABS-CBN News (10/16/16) Inquirer Mindanao (10/16/16)**

On 29 OCT 2016, combined military and police elements along with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) recovered an IED cache after a separate raid operations inside the Southern Philippine Development Authority (SPDA) compound in Tamontaka and Rosary Heights 7, Cotabato, Maguindanao, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao. The four suspects have ties to the Maute Group, and are linked to the 2 SEP Davao night market blast were arrested after forces raided their hideouts. The cache included three 60mm mortar IEDs, one 105mm howitzer IED, firearms, hand grenade and assorted ammunition. **InterAksyon (10/29/16) CNN (10/29/16)**

IED activity in the Philippines was low again in October, with no IED detonations recorded. The unilateral ceasefire between the Philippine government and the NDF continues to hold despite passing the 26 OCT deadline without a draft bilateral ceasefire agreement between the two parties. Government negotiators report it may take another month before a draft is ready to be signed, but are confident the ceasefire will hold while an agreement is worked out. Despite the ceasefire, the NPA continues recruiting in the Samar provinces.

The military's main focus continues to be neutralizing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Roughly 38 ASG militants have been killed since the military intensified combat operations in July. The military also launched 44 combat operations against the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and other local terrorist groups in Central Mindanao, along with the Maute Group in Lanao. Aggressive action by Philippine authorities is likely limiting insurgents' capabilities to perform attacks.



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

# Thailand: October IED Events



There were four IED events: two detonations (two devices) and two found and cleared (two devices)

On 12 OCT, a complex attack targeted a home in Mayo, Pattani. Unidentified men opened fire on the residence then emplaced an IED in front of the home as the left. The IED detonated a few minutes later damaging the front of the home, and injuring two men and a boy.

**Bangkok Post (10/13/16)**

On 24 OCT, an IED detonated targeting a popular noodle shop in Muang, Pattani; two civilians were killed and 20 wounded. Two men reportedly placed a 5kg IED concealed in a bag in front of the noodle shop. Shortly after the men's departure the IED detonated. EOD exploiting the scene reported that the device was initiated by a cellphone. **Thai PBS (10/26/16), Bangkok Post (10/24/16)**

Since 2011, October has averaged 15 IED events, including large scale coordinated attacks and/or attacks on civilian-populated areas to commemorate the Tak Bai Massacre that occurred on 25 October 2004. Coordinated attacks and targeting populated civilian areas is a specific TTP that insurgents use throughout the year when commemorating significant violent events conducted by the Royal Thai Army (RTA) against the Muslim population of the three southern provinces.


October 2016 had the lowest monthly total of IED events observed in Thailand. True to historical trends, one of the four attacks this month was a commemorative attack targeting a civilian area. The low number of IED attacks conducted this month is assessed to be related to the death of the King of Thailand, Bhumibol Adulyadej.

IED events are not expected to remain low in the coming months due to the King's passing, however, an increase in IED events so soon after his death may attract unwanted attention to the insurgents—it's possible the southern insurgents and surrounding communities in the three southern provinces want to avoid inciting the heavy-handed Thai government interventions they've experienced in the past. The military still leads the Thai government, and an increase in insurgent activity, especially large scale attacks during this time of mourning, may result in a temporary groundswell of Thai to support for greater military action against the Muslim population of the three southern provinces.


MARA-Pattani, an umbrella group for many of the insurgent organizations in the south, may have an opportunity to establish credibility with the Thai government during this time of mourning if it can control the violent groups. Acknowledging the importance of the King's death and not conducting attacks during this time may lead to more successful talks, if formal peace talks were to begin again.

IED activity will not completely stop; however, the mourning period for the King's death could benefit both the Thai government and southern Thai insurgents, should both sides exercise restraint during this time.

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

# Vietnam: October IED Events

There was one IED event: one IED detonation (one device)

On 4 OCT, a PBIED detonated in northern Quang Ninh, Northeast region, killing the bomber and one civilian, and injuring two civilians. The suspect, a 50-year old local named Thah, called for a taxi and detonated the device eight minutes after entering the cab. The taxi driver, 29-year old Dang Van Trung, was also killed. Another vehicle and a moped were damaged in the explosion with their respective drivers rushed to an undisclosed hospital for treatment. **VN Express International (10/4/16)**

Vietnam rarely experiences IED activity. The October event was classified as a suicide by authorities because the bomber left a suicide note stating he had been sick and wanted to die.

The region has continuously struggled with combating the smuggling of natural resources such as coal and commercial products, such as fireworks. Most of the smuggling has been products coming into Vietnam from China. However, these supply routes potentially could be used to transport IED components between countries given that the region experiences routine smuggling across these national borders.




*IED reporting statistics derived from OSINT are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.*



# Indonesia: October IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There were five IED events: three detonations (three devices) and two found and cleared (three devices)

On 13 OCT, an IED detonated near the house of a Golkar Party politician in Kotaraja, Jayapura, Papua. Police describe the device which targeted the politician as a low explosive similar to fish bombs and used an iron pipe container. A security guard reported seeing the blast occurring seconds after the device was emplaced and two men on separate motorcycles speeding up out of the area following the blast. **Jakarta Globe (10/13/16) Jakarta Post (10/14/16) Jakarta Post (10/13/16)**

On 20 OCT, two IEDs were found and cleared after an ISIL militant threw them at police in Cikokol, Tangerang. The IEDs failed to detonate, so the 21-year-old attacker, Sultan Azinsyah, stabbed three policemen. He was eventually brought down by police gunfire and later died of his wounds. Police believed he was ISIL-inspired because they found an ISIL sticker near the scene that he attached before the attack and confiscated jihadist literature from his person. **Anadolu Agency (10/21/16) SBS (10/20/16) NDTV (10/20/16) Straits Times (10/20/16) Coconuts (10/20/16)**

On 23 OCT, a timed IED detonated and a timed IED was found and cleared at a correctional facility in Lhokseumawe, Aceh; two prisoners were wounded. The IEDs were emplaced by two prisoners who were attempting to escape from prison, but the device failed to breach the wall and wounded them instead. During an

The 20 OCT IED attack marks the third ISIL-connected IED attack since June. Indonesian officials were quick to describe this attack, like the two other ISIL-connected attacks on 5 JUL in Solo 28 AUG in Medan, as a lone-wolf attack. Despite all three attacks involving a single individual however, there are indicators that these individuals were not self-motivated and self-indoctrinated, but recruited and guided by ISIL interlocutors. As has been previously written, ISIL-connected activity in Indonesia seems to be adapting to the effective security environment by employing a highly decentralized command and control strategy in their plots.

# Northeast Asia: October Significant Activity

## Japan-Philippines

During his visit to Japan, Philippines' President Duterte secured a loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for P6.8 billion (USD158 million) for the purchase of two maritime patrol vessels. Japan also granted the Philippines P280 million (USD5.7 million) to procure 15 high-speed maritime vessels. **Rappler (10/27/16)**

## Japan-ISIL

On 19 OCT, Kurdish authorities detained Japanese citizen Kosuke Tsuneoka (alias Shamil K Tsuneoka) near Mount Zerdek, Iraq for supporting ISIL. Tsuneoka allegedly converted to Islam in 2000. He fled to Vietnam in 2015 after the Japanese government began investigating his possible contacts with foreign terrorists. **Ara News (11/9/16) The Star (11/1/16)**

## China

On 25 OCT, representatives from China and the United States met to discuss deepening counter-terrorism cooperation. Topics covered in the discussions included regional terrorist threats, IEDs, information sharing, border security, and countering violent extremism. The talks have been held annually since 2014. **CBS News (10/25/16) Hindustan Times (10/26/16)**

# Japan: October IED Events



There was one IED event: one detonation (two devices)

On 23 OCT, a PBIED and an unknown IED were detonated by a disgruntled former Japanese Self Defense Force member at a cultural festival in Utsunomiya, Tochigi. The first detonation caused no casualties, while the second killed the bomber and injured three civilians. The first detonation occurred inside the bomber's vehicle and caused a fire in a parking area. The second detonation incorporated two cylinders (50cm x 6cm each) and string.

**Japan Times (10/23/16) BBC (10/23/16)**

IED events in Northeast Asia are often caused by personal grievances or disputes. In this particular event, the bomber wrote a suicide note to his family and may have burned down his own house prior to the attack. This type of behavior follows the general pattern of suicide events in Northeast Asia.

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# IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
<b>1 OCT 2005 (INDO):</b> Bali attack anniversary  <b>24 OCT 2002 (THA):</b> Tak Bai Incident  <b>1 OCT - 30 OCT (WW):</b> Al-Hijrah Muslim New Year  <b>23 NOV 2009 (PH):</b> Maguindanao Massacre  <b>26 NOV 2008 (IND):</b> Mumbai attack  <b>6 DEC 1992 (IND):</b> Babri Masjid Mosque Destruction  <b>14 DEC (IND):</b> ULFA Re-venge Day  <b>16 DEC (BNG):</b> Victory Day  <b>22 DEC (IND):</b> CPI-M Military Wing Anniversary  <b>25 DEC (IND):</b> Christmas Attack Anniversary	25	26	27	28	29	30	1 INDO WW
	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW	7 WW	8 WW
	9 WW	10 WW	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW	15 WW
	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW
	23 WW	24 WW TH	25 WW	26 WW	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW
	30 WW	31	1	2	3	4	5
November 2016	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	20	21	22	23 PH	24	25	26 IND
	27	28	29	30	1	2	3
December 2016	4	5	6 IND	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14 IND	15	16 BNG	17
	18	19	20	21	22 IND	23	24
	25 IND	26	27	28	29	30	31

IND – India  
 WW – Worldwide  
 PH – Philippines  
 TH – Thailand  
 INDO – Indonesia

# Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate  
 ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil  
 ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  
 CIV – Civilian  
 CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear  
 COIN – Counter-insurgency  
 CWIED – Command Wire IED  
 DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency  
 EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile  
 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
 F/C – Found & Cleared  
 HME – Homemade Explosives  
 HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)  
 IDF – Indirect Fire  
 IDP – Internally Displaced Persons  
 IED – Improvised Explosive Device  
 KFR – Kidnap for Ransom  
 KIA – Killed in Action  
 LOC – Line of Communication  
 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas  
 MSR – Main Supply Routes  
 NFI – No Further Information  
 NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report  
 OSINT – Open Source Intelligence

PBA – Post Blast Analysis  
 PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED  
 PCB – Printed Circuit Board  
 PN – Partner Nation  
 PPIED – Pressure Plate IED  
 QRF – Quick Response Force  
 RCIED – Radio Controlled IED  
 RCP – Route Clearance Patrols  
 RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade  
 SA – South Asia  
 SAF – Small Arms Fire  
 SEA – Southeast Asia  
 SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED  
 TATP – Triacetone Peroxide  
 TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C<sub>7</sub>H<sub>5</sub>N<sub>3</sub>O<sub>6</sub>)  
 TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures  
 UXO – Unexploded Ordnance  
 VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED  
 VEO – Violent Extremist Organization  
 VOIED – Victim Operated IED  
 WIA – Wounded in Action

# Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group  
 BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters  
 BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani  
 BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate  
 BSF – Border Security Forces  
 BNP – Bangladesh National Party  
 BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)  
 CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)  
 CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)  
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines  
 CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)  
 GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani  
 HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen  
 HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)  
 HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh  
 IB – India's Intelligence Bureau  
 IM – Indian Mujahideen  
 IrW – Irregular Warfare  
 ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)  
 ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  
 JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid  
 JI – Jemaah Islamiya  
 JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha  
 JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed  
 JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh  
 JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh  
 KIA – Kachin Independence Army  
 KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao  
 KIO – Kachin Independence Organization  
 LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba  
 MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
 MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group  
 MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front  
 NPA – New People's Army  
 PNP – Philippine National Police  
 POLRI – Indonesian National Police  
 PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization  
 RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)  
 RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil  
 SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha  
 SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha  
 ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam  
 UWSA – United Wa State Army  
 YCL – Youth Communist League